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This article offers a close reading of the figurative language used to 
represent suffering in literary testimonies of the Nazi concentration camps. It 
begins with an overview of the debate over the legitimacy of figurative 
language in representations of the Holocaust and considers the arguments 
against metaphor by scholars in the field of pain research and Holocaust 
studies. Bringing into dialogue the disciplines of pain studies and Holocaust 
studies, the article advances the claim that figurative language is an effective 
means of expressing suffering and that an analysis of this language is 
valuable for understanding the experiences of the victims of Nazism. The 
article subsequently presents a comparative analysis of Se questo è un uomo 
(1947) by Primo Levi, Le grand voyage (1963) by Jorge Semprún, and K.L. 
Reich (1963) by Joaquim Amat-Piniella. It identifies two patterns in the 
representation of suffering by these author-survivors: first, the use of 
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zoomorphic metaphors to describe bodily pain and, second, the depiction of 
anthropomorphized landscapes to portray psychological anguish. 
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The survivors of Nazi concentration camps often question whether language 
is able to convey the horrors they experienced as prisoners. In his memoir of 
life in Auschwitz, Primo Levi claims that words such as hunger, fear, pain, 
and cold offer only a pale reflection of the realities prisoners faced. Levi 
speculates that had the camps been around for longer, a harsh, new language 
would have evolved within their confines.1 But in the absence of this 
imagined linguistic system that might have furnished resources better suited 
to representing the camps, the authors of concentrationary testimonies make 
use of certain tropes to portray suffering at the extremes of human 
experience. In a comparative analysis of Se questo è un uomo (1947) by 
Primo Levi, Le grand voyage (1963) by Jorge Semprún, and K.L. Reich 
(1963) by Joaquim Amat-Piniella, this article identifies two patterns in the 
representation of suffering by these author-survivors: first, the use of 
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zoomorphic metaphors to describe bodily pain and, second, the depiction of 
anthropomorphized landscapes to portray psychological anguish. 
The article begins with an overview of the debate over the status of 
figurative language in representations of the Holocaust. After summarizing 
the arguments of thinkers who have questioned the legitimacy of using 
metaphors to write about the Holocaust specifically and about suffering in 
general, the first part of the article argues that figurative language is an 
effective means of expressing suffering and that an analysis of this language 
is valuable for understanding the experiences of the victims of Nazism. The 
second part of the article explores the role of animal imagery in the above-
mentioned works by Levi, Semprún, and Amat-Piniella and illustrates how 
zoomorphic metaphors are used to describe the physical suffering and loss 
of humanity to which deportees and prisoners were subjected. The third part 
of the article examines how psychological suffering is articulated in 
descriptions of landscapes, onto which the protagonists’ emotions are 
projected. By identifying these zoomorphic and anthropomorphic tropes 
shared by works written in Italian, French, and Catalan, the article seeks to 
determine the commonalities in the ways suffering is represented across a 
range of testimonial narratives of the Nazi camps and, at the same time, to 
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elucidate the contribution of testimonial works to our understanding of 
victims’ experiences. 
Concentration camp testimonies use similar metaphors to those 
found in patient narratives and in literary accounts of pain. Arthur W. Frank 
places trauma survivor stories alongside illness narratives, transgender 
narratives, and spiritual autobiographies as cognate genres of self-narration.2 
Like illness narratives, concentrationary testimonies are born of what Frank 
calls a “narrative wreckage”; both types of narrative instantiate the act of 
reclaiming the self from that wreckage.3 The connection between these two 
types of self-story at the macrostructural level of the narrative is also 
reflected at a granular linguistic level. In his survey of metaphors of pain 
used by patients and by creative writers, David Biro pinpoints three distinct 
metaphorical strategies used to represent pain: first, that of pain as a weapon, 
in which the phenomenon is ascribed external agency and responsibility for 
injury to the body through the action of stabbing or shooting; second, that of 
pain as a mirror, in which the sensation is projected onto other objects, such 
as animals or trees; third, anatomic metaphors that generate an X-ray image 
of pain and its causes hidden inside the body.4 The figurative strategies used 
to represent pain in the concentrationary testimonies under analysis in this 
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article present some points of contact with Biro’s schema: the instances in 
which suffering is described with animal imagery or is projected onto the 
landscape correlate with the mirror-type metaphors theorized by Biro; 
weapon metaphors are evident on the occasions when pain is described by 
its impact on the skin. And yet the patterns of figurative language in these 
concentrationary texts—and the narrative arcs in which this language is 
embedded—are not wholly assimilable to those found in the illness 
narratives on which Biro’s study is based. Illness narratives are concerned 
with making sense of a changing identity marked by pathology. Such 
narratives are prompted by the sense of alienation resulting from physical 
and psychological alterations induced by illness and are aimed toward 
forging a sense of continuity between past and present selves.5 
Concentrationary narratives share some of these features, particularly the 
sense of alienation and the desire for self-repair through the act of 
storytelling, but the ostensible object of concentrationary discourse is to 
denounce crimes against humanity and to testify to the suffering of victims 
of genocide. Furthermore, concentrationary testimonies are not consistent 
with the narrative types underlying stories of illness. Frank identifies three 
recognizable types or modes of storytelling prevalent in illness narratives: 
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the restitution narrative that enacts the plot of restoring health; the chaos 
narrative that denies the possibility of restitution and fails to mediate and 
impose order on the confusion of lived experience; the quest narrative that 
does not seek to negate illness—in the vein of the restitution narrative—or 
become overwhelmed by illness and its attendant disasters—as in the chaos 
narrative—but rather seeks to accept illness as part of a journey from which 
something is to be gained.6 Concentrationary testimonies differ in some 
important respects from these illness narrative types. Unlike restitution 
narratives, they are concerned with the residual trauma of the experience and 
with the impossibility of returning to normalcy. Although they share with 
chaos narratives a disbelief in the promises of restitution and narration, 
concentrationary testimonies chart their protagonists’ endeavor to reconcile 
themselves with chaos and to adapt to chaos in the struggle for survival. 
Finally, concentrationary testimonies are quite unlike quest narratives in 
their negation of the potential to find meaning in needless suffering and 
death. In the narratives by Levi, Semprún, and Amat-Piniella, the customary 
metaphors of projection typically found in writing about illness are 
intimately connected with the contexts of incarceration and dehumanization 
to which the testimonies bear witness. Physical pain in these texts is beastly 
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precisely to the extent that the prisoners of Nazi camps are reduced to the 
status of animals by their captors. Emotional anguish finds expression in the 
natural landscape logically as a result of the protagonists’ captivity. 
Concentration camp testimony presents a unique rhetorical profile that has 
been neglected by the field of pain research, which shows a marked 
preference for illness narratives as the corpus from which linguistic studies 
of pain are derived. Despite its value in documenting suffering at the very 
limits of human experience, concentration camp testimony has remained for 
the most part outside of the purview of pain studies. This article seeks to 
establish a dialogue between pain studies and Holocaust studies: an analysis 
of the rhetorical and linguistic strategies by which pain is articulated by 
authors such as Levi, Semprún, and Amat-Piniella complements and indeed 
broadens the traditionally narrow focus of pain studies on illness; at the 
same time, insights from the field of pain research can illuminate the 
linguistic mechanisms by which suffering is expressed in concentration 
camp testimony. 
    




The relationship between Holocaust writing and metaphor has been uneasy. 
In a study of the controversy surrounding the role of metaphors in 
representing the Holocaust, James Young traces the mistrust of figurative 
language back to the victims’ own struggle to transmit the facts of their 
experience.7 The chief purpose of writing about the Holocaust has long been 
regarded as the transmission of accurate historical data. The emphasis on 
hard facts is partly a reaction to the Nazis’ endeavor to conceal their criminal 
acts and negationists’ subsequent efforts to persevere with that enterprise. 
Establishing a factual historical record was of paramount concern in the war 
crimes trials after World War II. The prosecution’s preference for 
documentary evidence over victims’ testimony in the Nuremberg trials helps 
to explain why some concentration camp survivors became preoccupied 
with the factual status of their narratives as they struggled to assert the 
legitimacy of first-hand accounts. The mistrust of metaphor stems also from 
a wider suspicion of the literary medium, which is felt to be inappropriate in 
the context of the solemnity that ought to mark the memory of the Nazis’ 
extermination of the European Jews. Among the specific charges leveled by 
scholars in the discipline of Holocaust studies are that metaphors distort 
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facts and deflect our attention from reality. It has been argued that metaphors 
are essentially escapist.8  
 Metaphors have attracted criticism also within the discipline of pain 
studies. Elaine Scarry observes that there is a limited linguistic repertoire for 
describing pain and that tired verbal strategies, such as the metaphor of pain 
as a weapon or external agent, can misrepresent the nature of pain and 
obscure the physical suffering of victims.9 Susan Sontag also discusses the 
perils of metaphors used in the context of illness. According to Sontag, the 
use of illness as a metaphor demonizes the ill and obscures understanding of 
their condition. Such metaphors are potentially dangerous in the hands of 
totalitarian movements, which use metaphors of disease to galvanize 
hostility toward enemies and political opponents. Sontag concedes that 
metaphors have filled a vacuum in public discourse as the decline of 
religious and philosophical language has left us without the tools to discuss 
evil, but nonetheless she urges resistance against the allures of facile 
metaphors and advocates the virtues of plain speaking.10 
The misgivings over metaphor shared by scholars in the fields of 
pain studies and Holocaust studies point to a wider practical and ethical 
problem concerning the relationship between language and the phenomenon 
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of human suffering. At stake in both fields of study is the question of 
whether language is able to or should be free to express suffering. Pain 
researchers thus ponder whether language can make such a private 
experience as pain available to others or whether the experience simply 
underscores the isolation inherent in the human condition.11 Holocaust 
scholars wonder whether there is a danger that cultural works create a false 
sense of intimacy with victims and the illusion of comprehending their 
experience.12 In both fields there is a concern about what is lost in the 
passage from the private realm to the public, and these parallel debates over 
the relationship between language and suffering constitute a further point of 
intersection between pain studies and Holocaust studies, which reveals the 
potential for mutually enlightening cross-fertilization of ideas and concepts.  
 The idea that figurative language in some way falsifies the reality of 
pain and does a disservice to its sufferers does not imply that such language 
fails on a communicative level. Descriptions of suffering need not be 
representationally accurate in order to achieve the aim of sensitizing readers 
to the plight of others, and figurative language is able to make the subjective 
experience of pain intelligible to readers. Pain is a notoriously slippery 
concept. Within the various disciplines that are concerned with pain 
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research, such as philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience, there is a lack 
of consensus regarding the nature of pain.13 In philosophy, 
representationalist accounts view pain as a perception that conveys 
information regarding actual or potential tissue damage. Conversely, in 
phenomenological accounts, pain begins as a raw feeling, which only 
subsequently is ascribed to an object or source. The difficulty of pinning 
down exactly what constitutes it has led some philosophers to advocate 
dispensing with the folk concept of pain. The variety of attributes that have 
been assigned to pain—a pure sensation occurring within a subjective 
experience; a detection of tissue damage; an unpleasant feeling; an impulse 
to protect the damaged area—suggests that it cannot be considered 
something in and of itself but is rather a complex neurobiological 
mechanism involving the processing of nociceptive stimuli across many 
different areas of the nervous system and feedback through an equally 
complex system of pain inhibition. The elaborate neurobiology of pain helps 
to explain the coexistence of its seemingly incompatible characteristics as 
both subjective and objective, incorrigible and yet subject to error. Pain can 
be all of these things because it is not an isolated phenomenon, but a generic 
term for a complex interaction of physiological processes.14 Given the 
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instability of pain as a concept and the private and subjective aspects of the 
experience, it is plausible that metaphors might well be useful for capturing 
the unique sensory qualities of that experience.15 As regards the description 
of suffering, which is a secondary emotion that stems from prolonged 
reflection on the initial physical experience of pain, the extended duration of 
the experience expands the opportunities for stylization.16 Protracted 
meditation on the longer-term consequences of pain is likely to bring in its 
wake a heightened concern with expression. In clinical practice, 
metaphorical language is used by patients to communicate their symptoms to 
physicians, and it is unreasonable to expect literary works to be divested of 
figurative expression.17 Some scholars go as far as to argue that figurative 
expression is no mere ornament but is rather a necessary precondition for 
sharing the experience of pain. Frank puts it memorably when he observes 
that the “ill body is certainly not mute—it speaks eloquently in pains and 
symptoms—but it is inarticulate.”18 Biro claims that “metaphor isn’t merely 
a rhetorical device that dresses up language but a powerful and necessary 




Just as pain researchers recognize that pain and the linguistic and 
narrative forms used to describe it are in some sense inseparable, Young 
insists that metaphors are an unavoidable corollary of the use of language to 
discuss the Holocaust. Their presence in the earliest Holocaust testimonies 
suggests they played a significant role in how victims perceived the 
experience: “Rather than seeing metaphors as threatening to the facts of the 
Holocaust, we must recognize that they are our only access to the facts, 
which cannot exist apart from the figures delivering them to us.”20 The 
paradigm shift in Holocaust studies that has catapulted survivor testimonies 
to the center of historiography is predicated on the belief that these 
testimonies offer a perspective that cannot be subsumed within traditional 
historical accounts.21 The significance of survivor testimonies, beyond their 
utility as historical sources, derives from the unique manner in which they 
transmit awareness of the experience.22 To the extent that they facilitate a 
connection with survivors’ experiential knowledge of the Nazi camps, 
testimonies are a compelling medium for drawing attention to the suffering 
endured by victims of Nazism. Representations of psychological and 
physical torment are a salient feature of concentrationary testimonies. They 
constitute some of the most memorable and haunting images in these texts 
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and are central to the pathos generated by testimonial works. An analysis of 
the figurative language through which the theme of suffering is articulated 
helps to account for the peculiar affective potency of the testimonial genre as 
well as to illustrate the precise ways in which author-survivors transmit their 
experiences of Nazi atrocities to readers. 
The three texts under analysis in this article are all works of 
concentration camp testimony in the sense that their authors were 
imprisoned in Nazi concentration camps and depicted their experiences 
there, albeit with varying degrees of literary-fictional artifice. Although all 
three texts might be categorized broadly as testimony, each can be assigned 
a slightly different generic designation, depending on its narrative 
perspective and the extent to which its content could be described as factual. 
The three texts can be further differentiated according to whether the author 
was a political prisoner or a Jewish survivor of the Holocaust. Primo Levi’s 
Se questo è un uomo is a memoir of life in an extermination camp written by 
an Italian Jew. The text is written in the first person and the narrator is 
identical with the author himself. The text maintains a fairly strict 
relationship with historical fact in the sense that the people and events 
depicted are presented as actual people and events.23 We might assume that 
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some of the dialogue is fictionalized, and the text is evidently replete with 
poetic imagery and metaphor. But the core of Levi’s text is a factual account 
of the author’s experience in Auschwitz, and the propositional content of 
that account is true. The paratextual material, such as the blurb included in 
editions of the text and Levi’s own prologue and epilogue, encourages us to 
view the text as a memoir. And because it was written by a Jewish survivor 
of the Nazis’ policy to exterminate European Jews—a survivor, moreover, 
of one of the death camps in which the exterminatory policy was put into 
practice—Levi’s text is a Holocaust memoir. Jorge Semprún and Joaquim 
Amat-Piniella were political prisoners in Nazi camps: Semprún was 
deported because of his activity in the French resistance movement, while 
Amat-Piniella, an exiled Spanish Republican, was captured by the 
Wehrmacht while working in one of the Companies of Foreign Workers on 
the Maginot line and subsequently sent to a concentration camp as a foreign 
undesirable after a brief spell of administrative limbo in various prisoner-of-
war camps.24 Political prisoners in Nazi concentration camps endured 
torture, starvation, beatings, and forced labor. However, they were targeted 
not because of their identity but, notionally at least, in punishment for their 
acts and, therefore, unlike Jewish prisoners, were not subject to systematic 
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extermination. Set apart from Levi’s Holocaust memoir by the identity of 
their authors, Semprún’s and Amat-Piniella’s concentration camp narratives 
can be distinguished from one another by the formal features of each text. Le 
grand voyage is a first-person autofiction that blends autobiography with 
fictional conceits. It shares with Semprún’s other texts the trompe l’œil 
theatrics by which pseudonyms blur the readily apparent correspondences 
between narrator and author, and Semprún even admits to fictionalizing 
certain aspects of his deportation to Buchenwald.25 K.L. Reich is more 
openly fictional: it is a novel written in the third person that is inspired by 
the author’s experiences in Mauthausen. The three texts under consideration 
in this article constitute different approaches to testimonial genre. At one 
end of the spectrum is a Holocaust memoir by a Jewish writer; at the other 
end is a concentration camp novel by a Spanish political prisoner. 
Semprún’s narrative sits somewhere in the middle: vaguely 
autobiographical, it resembles a memoir, but with a liberal dose of fiction 
that approximates the novel. This article will show that despite these generic 
differences and the status of these texts with regard to the canon of 
Holocaust literature, there are commonalities in the representation of 






K.L. Reich is a novel written in Catalan and based on Amat-Piniella’s 
experience in the Mauthausen concentration camp, where he was deported in 
January 1941. Amat-Piniella spent the following four and a half years in the 
main camp and its satellites and was freed in May 1945. A Catalan patriot, 
Amat-Piniella had fought for the Republican side in the Spanish Civil War 
and had gone into exile in France following the Nationalist victory. He spent 
a number of months in French internment camps, which were hastily erected 
in the south of the country to receive the hundreds of thousands of 
Republican refugees who crossed over the Pyrenees, and subsequently 
enlisted in the Compagnies de travailleurs étrangers. When the workers’ 
legions fell under the German occupation, Amat-Piniella was among those 
sent to prisoner-of-war camps.26 However, the German government did not 
consider the Spaniards among those captured in the workers’ legions to be 
prisoners of war, given that Germany and Spain were not at war, and they 
were subsequently deported to concentration camps.27 The majority of the 
Spaniards—around ninety percent—were sent to Mauthausen, a category 
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three concentration camp in which delinquents, undesirables, and political 
prisoners considered beyond redemption by the Nazi authorities were 
worked to death in the infamous quarry, as well as being subjected to 
torture, execution, starvation, and medical experiments. Although 
Mauthausen did have a gas chamber, the camp was not specifically designed 
for the extermination of Jews. Jews nevertheless passed through the camp 
and were subjected to the harshest treatment, a fact to which Amat-Piniella 
attests in his novel. Mauthausen was a particularly brutal camp: according to 
the best estimates, only 2,000 Spaniards survived out of the 7,000 who were 
deported there.28 The minority deported to other camps tended to fare better, 
but in most cases the statistics are unreliable and fail to account for the 
numbers who died in transit or during the period immediately before and the 
year following liberation. All in all, around sixty percent of the 8,000 
Spanish prisoners in Nazi camps died, which represents the highest mortality 
rate among national groups.29 
Thanks to the intercession of a friend, Amat-Piniella was first 
assigned to the Effektenkammer, and was therefore initially spared the very 
worst of the brutality and privations that reigned in the outdoor labor 
battalions. Although in the autumn of 1941 Amat-Piniella spent three harsh 
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months in the quarry, once again his contacts soon intervened and he was 
transferred to a Kommando under César Orquín Serra, a fellow Spaniard 
who organized exterior work details with more generous rations and less 
brutal conditions, in which the prisoners’ chances of survival were 
substantially improved.30 
K.L. Reich shadows the vicissitudes of Amat-Piniella’s own 
experience in Mauthausen: newly arrived in the camp, the main character, 
Emili, escapes its horrors through his assignment to the Effektenkammer; 
after a fall from grace Emili finds himself facing a death sentence in an 
outdoor work detail and is subsequently rescued by joining a Kommando 
headed by August, a character based on César Orquín Serra, where he is able 
to wait out the end of the war.  The author filters his own experience through 
those of a number of fictional characters, some of whom are based loosely 
on people he knew. The novel as a form enables Amat-Piniella to explore 
characters and their experiences from the inside; events witnessed are 
invested with the quality of lived experience, as the author uses his first-
hand knowledge to flesh out the lives of his characters in a third-person 
narrative that captures eloquently the severity of conditions in the camp. 
Amat-Piniella’s portrayal of the brutality of the concentration camp system 
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is especially vivid in the scenes describing the physical torture meted out by 
the SS to punish misdemeanors. A public flogging in the roll call square is 
described with a lexis rich in animal imagery: “Per tota la plaça es percebien 
netament els espetecs del fuet a un ritme de martell sobre l’enclusa, talment 
com si batessin un coixí de cuiro. De sobte, un crit esgarrifós esquinçà el 
silenci de la multitud, un crit que s’arrossegà diversos segons com un udol” 
(Throughout the square the cracking of the whip was heard clearly with the 
rhythm of a hammer against the anvil, as if a leather cushion were being 
beaten. Suddenly, a bloodcurdling cry sliced through the silence of the 
crowd and lingered on a number of seconds like a howl).31 The cadence of 
the cracking whip is likened to a hammer against the anvil, and the victim’s 
skin is a cowhide resembling the leather cushion used in metalwork. The 
victim’s cry tears violently into the silence of the assembled prisoners, trails 
on the air, and drags itself through space with the motion of a cowering 
beast. The scream is made especially vivid by Amat-Piniella’s use of 
alliteration in the phrase “un crit esgarrifós esquinçà el silenci” and in the 
sibilance that reverberates in the first and last syllables of “esgarrifós,” 
“esquinçà,” and “silenci.” The cry is invested with a lupine quality as Amat-
Piniella likens it to a howl. The victim of the flogging is forced to count 
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aloud the number of blows inflicted, but the words themselves are 
dispossessed of their human quality; they are “deformats pel dolor, guturals i 
inintel·ligibles” (94) (deformed by pain, guttural, and unintelligible). As the 
torture nears its end, the prisoner’s sounds become increasingly beastlike:  
Eren uns gemecs allargassats com els d’un animal ferit, tan aviat 
aguts i penetrants, com apagats igual que ecos dels anteriors. . . . Uns 
moments després, els gemecs eren dominats pels lladrucs i els 
grinyols dels gossos. Una esgarrifança sotraguejà l’assamblea com 
un corrent elèctric. La matinada semblava un aiguafort goyesc. (95) 
 
(The moaning was drawn out like that of a wounded animal; it 
ranged from shrill and piercing to a muffled echo of the former. 
Moments later the moaning was drowned out by the barking and 
howling of the dogs. A shudder ran through the crowd like an 
electric current. The daybreak seemed like a Goya etching.) 
The prisoner’s voice has become that of a wounded animal. His plaintive 
ululations have an Orphic quality as the intonations of this nightmarish chant 
awaken the camp commandant’s dogs. In this ghoulish communion of the 
human and animal worlds, the barking drowns out the prisoner’s agony and 
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the assembled witnesses to the scene are gripped with horror. The 
comparison with a Goya etching reinforces the savagery of the scene, calling 
to mind the mutilated bodies and grotesque scenes of torture captured in the 
Disasters of War. The analogy is pertinent for another reason: animals 
feature prominently in Goya’s portrayals of suffering, which include 
allegorical wolves, horses, vultures, and giant beasts feeding on human 
carrion. Just as human-animal hybrids bring out the ghastly aspects of 
human nature in Goya’s Disasters, in K.L. Reich animal metaphors convey 
the barbarous nature of physical torture. Amat-Piniella traces the process by 
which the governing principles of morality break down when respect is lost 
for the inviolability of the individual. The human body, divested of its 
sanctity, becomes animal flesh. Language becomes mere sound: the grunting 
or howling of prey. 
Other scenes of torture in K.L. Reich illustrate this same loss of 
language and subsequent transition into the animal kingdom. After stealing a 
fellow prisoner’s bread, a starving prisoner is stripped, forced into a cage, 
and subjected to water torture. The transformation from human to animal is 
traced in the decomposition of language. In the first part of the description 
the words “gemec” (moan) and “xiscle” (scream) describe ostensibly human 
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sounds: “Se li escapà un gemec prolongat que sense transició es transformà 
en un xiscle allargassat i agudíssim, dominant per uns moments la remor de 
l’aigua i les rialles dels botxins” (139–40) (He let out a long, uninterrupted 
moan that morphed into a drawn-out, high-pitched scream, which for a 
moment drowned out the murmur of the water and the laughing of the 
torturers). The progressive deformation of the sounds is conveyed by the 
qualifiers “prolongat,” “allargassat,” and “agudíssim,” which begin to 
remove the prisoner’s cries from the realm of ordinary human noises. His 
peculiar cries are juxtaposed with the laughing of the human torturers, and in 
the second part of the description the cries become howls:  
Els udols se succeïen, cada vegada més atroços. … [El] fred … 
debilitava la seva veu fins a reduir-la al somiqueig d’una criatura. El 
baiard havia esdevingut balder, d’encongit que estava el cos que 
empresonava. A través dels llistons no es distingia més que una 
massa informe i bruna, sacsejada de tant en tant pels espasmes d’una 
agonia que començava. (140) 
 
(The howls came in succession, each more monstrous than the last. 
His voice was weakened by the cold and was reduced to the 
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whimpering of a creature. The cage had become spacious as the body 
imprisoned within it had curled up. All that could be made out 
through the bars was a shapeless, brown mass, which was convulsed 
from time to time by the death throes that were underway.)  
The prisoner’s voice is now the whimpering of an animal and his body is a 
shriveled brown mound, devoid of human form. 
In Jorge Semprún’s testimony of his deportation to Buchenwald, 
human bodies also lose their defining features. Packed into a freight wagon, 
the compressed mass of individuals in Le grand voyage are fused together: 
they are “entassés les uns sur les autres” (heaped on top of each other) and 
“imbriqués l’un dans l’autre” (enveloped within one another); the human 
shipment resembles the cargo for which the transport container was 
designed.32 The deportees’ individual identities are subsumed in this morass 
of bodies, which acts as one and moves in unison. The bodies amalgamate in 
a “gelée épaisse” (66) (thick jelly), which sways with the jolting movements 
of the train and culminates in the decomposition of individual identity: “Ce 
n’était plus ni moi, ni lui, ni toi, qui criait ou chuchotait, mais le magma 
gangueux que nous formions, par ces cent dix-neuf bouches anonymes” 
(241) (It was no longer I, nor he, nor you who shouted or whispered, but the 
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molten compound in which we were fused, with our hundred and nineteen 
anonymous mouths).  
Among the techniques employed by Semprún to convey the 
dehumanizing nature of his deportation, animal metaphors play a significant 
role. Early in the text, an enraged fellow deportee voices the first of these 
zoological similes. Incensed at having been mistaken for a maquis 
sympathizer and arrested, the hothead spits invectives at the protagonist: 
“Vous allez crever comme des rats” (30) (You are going to die like rats). In 
his hysterical tirade, he likens the maquis to rodents whose insignificant 
lives will be taken without a second thought. As well as articulating the idea 
that the deportees are no more than vermin in the eyes of their captors, the 
rat simile is also suggestive of the deportees’ own state of mind. The 
allusion to rats in this context calls to mind the expression “être fait comme 
un rat” (to be trapped) and connotes the wretched conditions of deportation. 
Later, as the compressed mass of bodies recoils from a corpse in its midst, 
Semprún uses the metaphor of an oyster retracting within its shell to 
describe the deportees’ motion (76). The human body, when it appears, is 
described with metaphors of sickness and disease, which capture its frailty 
and the process of its decomposition. The protagonist’s growing sense of 
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anguish caused by his confinement is characterized as the spread of dead 
tissue: “Elle envahit comme une gangrène mon corps brisé par la fatigue” 
(81) (Like gangrene it invades my body, which is broken through 
exhaustion). Some prisoners, fortunate enough to survive the deportation, 
will be poisoned by the camp’s water the very night of their arrival. 
Semprún writes that their lack of restraint in quenching their desperate thirst 
will leave them “malades comme des chiens” (141) (sick as dogs). The 
narrator uses the image of a galloping horse to express the pain that ravages 
his body: “Je ne suis plus qu’une morne étendue piétinée par le galop des 
douleurs lancinantes” (148) (I am but a desolate expanse trampled by the 
gallop of shooting pains). In another carriage, the deportees are stripped 
naked in punishment for their attempted escape, and the narrator refers to the 
“spectacle grotesque de ces hommes nus, sautillant comme des singes” (164) 
(grotesque spectacle of these naked men hopping along like apes). As he 
dies in the suffocating final hours of the deportation, the protagonist’s 
companion gasps for breath with “la bouche ouverte comme un poisson” 
(243) (his mouth wide open like a fish).  
Just as in K.L. Reich, in which language disintegrates under physical 
torture, the sounds emitted by the deportees in Le grand voyage follow a 
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similar regression to grunting and other animal sounds devoid of linguistic 
content. As the protagonist’s companion grumbles discontentedly, his voice 
is described with the verb grogner (70). The verb captures the character’s 
brooding tone and, at the same time, infuses the description with the bestial 
nuances conveyed by this polysemic verb, which is also used to describe the 
sounds made by pigs and bears. When the word recurs later in the narrative 
in its nominal form “grognements” (163) (grunts), it does so with more 
deliberately porcine overtones as the deportees are corralled into the wagon 
like livestock. Semprún uses the verb braire in a similar fashion to 
underscore the herd-like quality of the prisoners in the transport wagon 
(251). This disfigurement of human language appears in the narrator’s 
recollection of a prisoner’s “voix rauque…déjà inhumaine” (156) (hoarse, 
already inhuman voice) and the “plainte interminable, inhumaine” (243) 
(interminable, inhuman cry) of another on the cusp of death. The dying 
prisoner who emits this infernal sound is but the shadow of a human being; 
no longer a man, he is just “cette bête” (244) (this animal).  
Amat-Piniella and Semprún use animal metaphors to capture the 
sensation of pain inflicted on the body and to trace the disintegration of the 
human body and language under conditions of extreme hardship. Primo Levi 
28 
 
deploys an abundance of animal metaphors to similar ends, but these 
metaphors are more developed in Levi’s work and are used to convey 
philosophical ideas about the Nazi camps. The frequent allusions to animals 
in Levi’s work have been the subject of sustained critical attention.33 On the 
most basic level, these allusions articulate the idea that the Nazi camps were 
a place where men were divested of their human condition. Upon their 
arrival in the camps prisoners were dispossessed, stripped naked, shaven, 
given a uniform, and assigned a number. The trappings of human identity 
were eliminated in accordance with an ideology that viewed these prisoners 
as subhuman. The title of Levi’s celebrated testimony of Auschwitz 
announces the theme of dehumanization that is developed at length in the 
work itself. The words “se questo è un uomo” (if this is a man) are taken 
from a poem, written by Levi and appended as a preface to the book. In the 
poem, Levi juxtaposes the implied readers of his book, safe in their warm 
homes, with the miserable beings who dwelled in the Nazi camps. Levi asks 
that we consider if those beings who labored in the mud, knew no peace, 
fought for scraps of bread, and were murdered arbitrarily might be called 
men. “Considerate se questo è un uomo” (7) (Consider if this is a man), the 
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poem beseeches us, and the book proceeds to illustrate the manifold ways 
humanity is crushed by the camp regime. 
The frequent references to animals are part of what Marco Belpoliti 
and Robert Gordon describe as Levi’s ethological vocabulary.34 Levi 
describes the concentration camps as a “gigantesca esperienza biologica e 
sociale” (79) (giant biological and social experiment), which provides an 
opportunity to study human behavior and its adaptations in the absence of 
social institutions. The camp system refuses to satisfy prisoners’ basic needs 
of survival and thereby suppresses their social instincts and reduces them to 
the condition of any other animal. The camps are a laboratory that reveals 
the “comportamento dell’animale-uomo di fronte alla lotta per la vita” (79) 
(behavior of the human animal facing the struggle for life) and on more than 
one occasion Levi uses the metaphor of an aquarium to capture how the 
camp resembles a controlled environment, in which social variables have 
been tuned out to enable the study of human beings in the wild (17, 95).  
Levi initially dons the attitude of disinterested naturalist observing a 
hitherto unknown specimen. After giving an account of his arrest and 
deportation, he reports his initial impressions of the camp upon 
disembarking from the transport. He describes the columns of prisoners 
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emerging from the darkness as one might another species. They are 
described as having a curious gait, with “il capo spenzolato in avanti e le 
braccia rigide” (18) (their heads dangling out in front and their arms rigid). 
The detached gaze of the naturalist soon assumes a more ominous 
complexion as the narrator comments, “Questa era la metamorfosi che ci 
attendeva” (18) (This was the metamorphosis that awaited us). The Ovidian 
overtones of the word “metamorfosi” are inescapable, for what Levi’s book 
documents is precisely a transformation from humanity into brutality, a 
descent into an animal underworld ruled by the basest of instincts in the 
struggle for survival. 
This metamorphosis is already palpable in Levi’s description of the 
conditions of deportation. Levi refers to the compacted human bodies in the 
transport wagon as “materia umana” (16) (human matter). The expression 
has an oxymoronic quality: the word “materia” suggests an inorganic 
substance, while the adjective “umana” stands in contrast to this formless 
mass and struggles to invest it with life. These human beings are on the cusp 
of mutation. Packed into transport wagons as chattel, they waver between 
animate and inanimate; a shapeless plasma resembling the mass of bodies in 
Semprún’s Le grand voyage, they are on the brink of assuming a new form. 
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By the time the deportees climb down from the wagons at their destination, 
the mutation is underway, as their movements on the platform are described 
with the verb brulicare (16), which is redolent of the swarming of insects. 
   The initiation in the camp evokes a fall from grace as the prisoners 
are divested of their human condition and regress through the ranks of the 
animal kingdom in a reversal of the Genesis creation narrative. Levi calls it 
“la demolizione di un uomo” (23) (the demolition of a man). All their 
earthly possessions are taken away—the clothes on their back, the hair on 
their heads, their shoes, their names—and even the power of speech: “Se 
parleremo, non ci ascolteranno, e se ci ascoltassero, non ci capirebbero” (23) 
(If we speak, they will not listen to us, and if they listen to us, they will not 
understand). They have descended to the very depths of creation and are 
now merely creatures, mute and subject to the dominion of their human 
masters: “Siamo arrivati al fondo. Piú giú di cosí non si può andare: 
condizione umana piú misera non c’è, e non è pensabile” (23) (We have 
reached the bottom. You cannot go any lower than this: there is no human 
condition more miserable, nor is one even conceivable). Like livestock they 
will be culled when no longer useful. After a fortnight of suffering and 
chronic privation the prisoners begin to resemble another species, and the 
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metamorphosis is complete. With distended bellies, stiff limbs, disfigured 
faces, and yellow or gray skin, the prisoners no longer recognize their own 
bodies or each other (32). 
Levi uses a wealth of animal imagery to articulate the bestial 
condition imposed on the inmates by the camp regime, which reduces their 
behavior to the instincts necessary for survival. The pain inflicted by 
beatings teaches the new arrivals to cower instinctively in the corners, 
“come fanno le pecore” (33) (as sheep do). The word bestia appears in 
multiple forms: from the inmates obliged to urinate bestially while running 
to save time (34) to the description of the camp itself, which is characterized 
as “una gran macchina per ridurci a bestie” (35) (a great machine to reduce 
us to beasts) and as “l’opera di bestializzazione” (152) (the work of 
bestialization). Levi describes the prisoners working in the outdoor labor 
battalions as “bestie stanche” (39) (tired beasts) and later, when he finds 
himself among the chemists selected for menial tasks in the laboratory, he 
describes how he and the others report for work with a timid, suspicious, and 
disoriented demeanor as if they were, “bestie selvagge che si addentrino in 
una grande città” (124) (wild beasts creeping into a big city). The Allied 
bombing raids leave the prisoners toiling amid “la polvere e le macerie 
33 
 
roventi, e tremare come bestie, schiacciati a terra” (105) (the dust and 
smoldering rubble, and trembling like beasts, hugging the earth). The 
prisoners face the conditions in the camp with brutish impassivity: “Non era 
rassegnazione cosciente, ma il torpore opaco delle bestie domate con le 
percosse, a cui non dolgono piú le percosse” (106) (It was not conscious 
resignation, but the dull numbness of beasts tamed by blows, whom the 
blows no longer hurt). Other prisoners are described as having “gli occhi 
come le bestie impaurite” (137) (the eyes of frightened cattle). Levi 
reinforces the metaphor of prisoners as animals with a number of similar 
lexical choices. The adjective selvaggio appears frequently, such as when a 
prisoner is said to exhibit “l’istintiva astuzia degli animali selvaggi” (88) 
(the instinctive astuteness of wild animals). Elsewhere the oxymoron 
“selvaggia pazienza” (71) (savage patience) is applied to the lupine 
individuals who prowl the underground market hoping to appease their 
hunger and whose savagery is transferred through hypallage to the patience 
they show in speculating on the stock market of bread and soup. The 
ferocious haste with which the prisoners eat is compared with the way 
animals feed (62, 68). The prisoners are often likened to sheep, such as when 
they are portrayed as a “gregge muto innumerevole” (106) (silent 
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innumerable flock) or when their smell is described as that of a kennel or 
sheepfold (62). On occasion, they are compared with worms, for example, in 
Levi’s description of the abandoned camp, in which prisoners suffering from 
dysentery drag themselves across the snow in search of food and wood while 
no longer in control of their bodily functions (63, 140–41). Elsewhere, they 
are “fantocci di fango” (118) (mud puppets) or “automi” (45) (automata). 
Levi uses these animal metaphors in the ethological vein highlighted 
above and illustrates the ways prisoners adapt to the conditions of the camp 
amid what he perceives as a brutal application of the Darwinian mechanism 
of the survival of the fittest. Jonathan Druker regards Levi’s use of 
Darwinian terminology as fallacious because it is applied not to describing 
biological change in a natural environment but to an artificial environment 
engineered by the Nazis to eliminate populations they deemed undesirable. 
Druker finds fault with Levi’s insistence on interpreting the Nazi camps 
through the lens of natural laws and observes that the Italian writer 
unwittingly lends credence to the ideas from which the Nazis’ racial theories 
derived.35 Although Levi does indeed imbue his testimony with a pseudo-
scientific flavor, he does not make any great claims for the empirical validity 
of his work as a study of human behavior. When outlining the ways the 
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camp might be understood as a biological and social experiment, he avoids 
overreaching and rejects the facile assumption that the Nazi camps reveal 
fundamental truths about human nature (79). Like Semprún, who is equally 
coy about drawing general truths regarding the human condition from 
prisoners’ behavior in the camps (Le grand voyage 72), Levi settles for the 
relatively circumspect conclusion that social instincts are dampened by acute 
necessity and hardship. Levi’s Darwinian tropes should be interpreted not as 
an attempt to prove a scientific thesis but as a powerful rhetorical device. 
Thus Levi describes the human adaptations he witnesses in the camp using 
the metaphor of an animal digging a niche or a secreting a shell, and he 
gives examples of prisoners who are well adapted to the conditions of the 
camp, again, often using animal metaphors (50). One has a nose for civilian 
soup that rivals that of “le api per i fiori” (68) (bees for flowers); he catches 
a whiff in the air and follows its tracks, “come un segugio” (68) (like a 
bloodhound). There is a prisoner who resembles a ferocious beast (87), 
while another moves like a cat and is as cunning as “il Serpente della 
Genesi” (90) (the snake of Genesis).  
Levi uses animal metaphors also to express the failure of some to 
adapt to the punishing conditions. Null Achtzehn gives the impression of 
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being as empty as the slough left by molting insects (37). He lacks the draft 
horse’s instinct of self-preservation and, like a sled dog, toils until he 
reaches a state of exhaustion (38). The Muselmänner are ultimate example 
of the failure to adapt to this “lotta per sopravvivere” (80) (struggle for 
survival), in the battle of the “bruti contro gli altri bruti” (83) (brutes against 
other brutes). Non-human, non-organic even, the Muselmänner are the 
formless masses that make up the backbone of the camp:  “Loro, la massa 
anonima, continuamente rinnovata e sempre identica, dei non-uomini che 
marciano e faticano in silenzio, spenta in loro la scintilla divina, già troppo 
vuoti per soffrire veramente” (81–82) (They, the anonymous mass, 
continually renewed and always identical, the non-men who march and 
struggle in silence, the divine spark extinguished within them, already too 
empty really to suffer).  
While Levi uses animal metaphors systematically to develop his 
ideas regarding the prisoners’ Darwinian adaptation to the subhuman camp 
conditions, animal metaphors are used to a similar end, albeit in a more 
rudimentary fashion, in Amat-Piniella’s and Semprún’s work. Here, too, we 
witness transformations undergone by the prisoners as they adapt to the 
world of the camp. In K.L. Reich Emili is disfigured by hard labor in the 
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quarry, which mutilates his hands and body, leaving him with a skeletal 
appearance: “Les feines dures li deformaven les mans. … Deixà una bona 
part de les seves carns a la pedrera” (201) (Hard labor deformed his hands. 
He lost all the meat on his bones in the quarry.) His body is reshaped by the 
harsh conditions. The extreme hunger that typifies the prisoner’s existence is 
personified as a bird of prey whose “urpes afuades” (201) (sharp claws) 
whittle away his flesh. Levi’s text is populated with human-animal hybrids 
whose survival instinct is likened to a capacity for assimilating the 
characteristics of disparate species. Similarly in K.L. Reich and Le grand 
voyage the price exacted for survival is the dispossession of human qualities 
and a descent into animality. But for Amat-Piniella and Semprún, this 
descent into animality is linked not so much with the brute physical 
competition that characterizes the animal world but instead with a loss of 
morality. Levi’s text would appear to suggest that the Jewish prisoners are 
spared some of the more pedantic bellyaching over the loss of one’s moral 
compass. Such is the unrelenting mercilessness of their struggle that Levi’s 
foremost concern is with sheer physical exertion, for which his animal 
imagery stands as a potent metaphor. Amat-Piniella and Semprún are more 
preoccupied with the prisoners’ moral degradation, which they regard as a 
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bestial regression. Amat-Piniella refers to this moral corruption and ruthless 
ethical egoism as “realisme animal” (201) (animal realism). Semprún also 
regards the erosion of altruism as a characteristic shared by the camps and 
the animal kingdom: “Dans les camps, l’homme devient cet animal capable 
de voler le pain d’un camarade, de le pousser vers la mort” (72) (In the 
camps, man becomes this animal that is capable of stealing a comrade’s 
bread, of nudging him toward death). The assumption is that no human 
being worthy of the name could exercise the radical egoism necessary to 
survive in the camps. In line with Levi, who envisages the camps as a 
biological and social experiment that lays bare the survival instincts of man 
in the wild, Semprún regards the camps as an extreme situation in which 
self-interest becomes a powerful tool for survival: “Les camps sont des 
situations limites, dans lesquelles se fait plus brutalement le clivage entre les 
hommes et les autres” (72) (The camps are an extreme situation in which the 
division between each and every man is made brutally clear). Amat-Piniella 
is also attuned to the “embrutiment de la gent” (202) (degradation of the 
people), who have become desensitized to the suffering of their fellow 
prisoners. The decline of individual concern for collective well-being has 
turned the camp into a “jungla” (202) (jungle). Amat-Piniella reflects on the 
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dual processes of physical and moral annihilation at work in the camps: “El 
nazisme provava d’anihilar físicament els seus enemics i, per si no ho 
aconseguia totalment, preparava l’atmosfera que pogués anul·lar-los 
moralment per sempre més” (71) (Nazism was aimed at the physical 
annihilation of its enemies and, in case it did not succeed completely, it 
provided the climate for their total moral ruin). Levi contemplates the 
destruction in the camps as a stripping away of the social refinements that 
define human beings and a double annihilation of both body and spirit as 
they are reduced to expendable beasts of burden (23). Amat-Piniella echoes 
Levi in his meditation on the destruction wrought by a coalition of physical 
degradation and moral corruption, as the corporeal annihilation of the 
weakest in the camp is compounded by the spiritual annihilation of the 
youngest and strongest, such that “si un dia sortien, ja no fossin homes” 
(229) (if they ever came out, they would no longer be men). The perversion 
of moral norms becomes yet another noose around the prisoners’ necks, an 
additional link in the chain of their enslavement, further impetus in their 
brutalization: “L’esperit del camp tenia l’home vençut i endogalat” (238) 
(The spirit of the camp had men subjugated and tethered). 
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 The linguistic and rhetorical strategies used to represent pain in these 
concentrationary testimonies by Levi, Semprún, and Amat-Piniella bear 
evident similarities with the strategies found in illness narratives, in which 
pain is figured as a weapon or mirror.36 It is noteworthy that similar 
strategies can be found in the depiction of suffering in fictional texts that are 
detached from the specific historical circumstances of European genocide or 
from the concrete realities of illness. J. M. Coetzee’s work offers a useful 
comparison both because of its thematic and philosophical concern with 
animals and because of its evocation of scenes of acute human suffering. 
Louis Tremaine observes a pattern in Coetzee’s novels whereby animal 
imagery is employed in the context of descriptions of suffering and death.37 
Even in Disgrace, which has a palpable thematic concern with animal 
welfare articulated in its protagonist’s growing sensitization to the plight of 
the animals around him, Coetzee’s descriptions of human pain use animal 
imagery to articulate the dehumanizing nature of suffering. Thus a scene of 
sexual violence in Disgrace compares the victim to a “rabbit when the jaws 
of the fox close on its neck,” and the protagonist’s trauma in the aftermath of 
his own and his daughter’s vicious assault is likened to the draining of 
lifeblood of a fly immobilized in a spider’s web: “It may take weeks, it may 
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take months before he is bled dry, but he is bleeding. When that is finished, 
he will be like a fly-casing in a spiderweb, brittle to the touch, lighter than 
rice-chaff, ready to float away.”38 Coetzee’s Life and Times of Michael K 
employs a variety of animal similes to represent the oppression of its main 
characters: Anna K relates the suffering caused by poverty to being a “toad 
under a stone”; she and her son huddle like “mice” amid the breakdown of 
social order around them; the protagonist K’s impotent and forlorn gaze on 
his dying mother is compared to the attitude of a “dumb dog.”39 The scenes 
set in a relocation camp in Life and Times of Michael K are reminiscent of 
concentration camp narratives. The depiction of deprivation and brutality in 
the camp exemplifies a wider interest in the Holocaust present in Coetzee’s 
work and typifies the author’s meditations on the parallels between the 
German Third Reich and South African apartheid. Brett Ashley Kaplan 
classifies this novel as a “landscape of Holocaust postmemory within South 
Africa” on the basis of its setting in a “quasi-concentration camp” and its 
central character, a “starving man reminiscent of a Holocaust victim.”40 
Coetzee uses the Holocaust in an allegory of South Africa in the apartheid 
era and interweaves tropes of dehumanization and animalization that recall 
the zoomorphic metaphors of concentrationary testimony. In Levi’s, Amat-
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Piniella’s, and Semprún’s works, the suffering depicted is of a different 
order of magnitude, but the zoomorphic imagery deployed differs only to the 
extent that it is more metaphorically elaborate and more thematically 
developed in the case of the testimonial works. Coetzee’s understated and 
terse style shows a preference for animal similes to represent his characters’ 
suffering: characters are likened to dogs, rodents, flies, and rabbits by virtue 
of situations in which their fragility is exposed by terrible circumstances. In 
concentrationary testimony, zoomorphic metaphors are integrated in a 
broader denunciation of Nazi ideology and of the enormity of human 
suffering in the camps. In its use of animal imagery, concentration camp 
testimony mobilizes similar figurative expression to that employed in other 
narrative accounts of pain, such as in illness narratives or literary fiction. 
These different genres display at their core a shared lexis for the articulation 
of suffering, which attains some of the most vivid and forceful expression 






Zoomorphic metaphors in K.L. Reich, Le grand voyage, and Se questo è un 
uomo vary in prominence across the three works. Nevertheless, in all three 
there is a link between the sensation of bodily pain and animal imagery. 
Animal imagery is also associated with a debasement of the human 
condition and with loss of language and morality, all of which are secondary 
symptoms of the prisoners’ suffering. At certain points in these narratives 
when physical discomfort subsides or the prisoners’ situation improves, the 
absence of pain does not herald a moderation of suffering, rather the nature 
of the suffering changes, as does the figurative language used to describe it. 
In K.L. Reich Emili becomes more sensitive to the emotional anguish 
of life in the camp once his more pressing needs of hunger and physical 
safety are satisfied by his assignment to the civilian clothing storeroom. 
Emili’s role in the Effektenkammer earns him the status of a privileged 
prisoner, and he enjoys the protection of the SS officer for whom he 
produces pornographic drawings. Similarly, in Se questo è un uomo Levi 
reports how a period of respite from the physical hardship of forced labor 
during his convalescence in the prisoners’ hospital brings in its wake a 
sharpening of psychological sensitivity. The “lunghissime giornate vuote” 
(long empty days) spent in the infirmary usher in a rekindling of the 
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prisoners’ conscience and a realization of the fragility of their personality: 
“abbiamo imparato che la nostra personalità è fragile, è molto piú in pericolo 
che non la nostra vita” (48) (we have learned that our personality is fragile 
and in much graver danger than our life). The moderation of intense physical 
discomfort affords Levi a heightened awareness of time’s passing, just as in 
K.L. Reich Emili’s sudden change of fortune with his assignment to the 
storeroom grants him “una impressió més exacta de la inexorable continuïtat 
del temps” (68) (a more accurate impression of the relentless continuity of 
time). Whereas forced labor is synonymous with beatings and a daily 
struggle to avert starvation, days spent in the prisoners’ hospital or in a 
privileged Kommando are comparatively empty. Levi’s “lunghissime 
giornate vuote” correlate with the “grisor buida i dissolvent d’aquest 
present” (104) (gray, empty, and evanescent present) in which Amat-
Piniella’s protagonist languishes. Levi explains that as physical pain 
subsides, it gives way to self-conscious reflection and the psychological 
anguish of “Heimweh” (48), or homesickness. Levi’s nostalgia is shared by 
Amat-Piniella’s protagonist: “L’enyorament pren una violència 
desacostumada; mai no s’ha sentit tan perdut, tan orfe, tan sol” (104) (The 
longing becomes more brutal than ever. He has never felt so lost, so 
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orphaned, so alone). Levi and Amat-Piniella suggest there is no solution for 
this particular ill, which is more oppressive than physical suffering. Levi 
writes of his comrades’ envy when he manages to escape the outdoor labor 
battalions with a comparatively tranquil position in the laboratory. But he 
struggles to find consolation in having traded the “rabbia del vento” (126) 
(fury of the wind) for the “pena del ricordarsi” (pain of memory). The 
resurfacing of his buried consciousness brings a ferocious longing to feel 
human. Amat-Piniella is resolute in his judgment of physical suffering as the 
lesser of the camp’s evils: 
Homes que no trobaven cap protecció, que passaven fam, que 
s’anaven morint a poc a poquet, no sofrien tant com d’altres per als 
quals, en tenir les necessitats peremptòries més cobertes, era 
l’imaginació la que creava els problemes irresolubles i, pitjor encara, 
sense esperança. (69) 
 
(Men who found no protection, who went hungry, who were slowly 
dying did not suffer as much as others who had their basic needs 
more or less covered and whose imagination created the insoluble 
and utterly hopeless problems.)  
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This hierarchy of pain, in which the physical torture of beatings and 
starvation is relegated behind the emotional anguish of the privileged 
prisoners, is suggested also in Levi’s discussion of the Muselmänner, whom 
he regards as “troppo vuoti per soffrire veramente” (82) (too empty really to 
suffer). These statements convey the abject condition of a human body that 
has become inured to pain. Whereas Amat-Piniella, Levi, and Semprún 
exhibit a preference for animal imagery in their representation of pain 
inflicted on the body, their portrayal of psychological suffering utilizes 
images of the landscape and natural world, which have an ethereal quality to 
the extent that they are landscapes remembered or viewed from afar. The 
prisoners’ emotional hardship is often articulated using the device of 
personification, by which depictions of surrounding landscapes are 
anthropomorphized through the projection of the characters’ emotional 
anguish.  
In K.L. Reich, Emili sees his despondency reflected in the rainfall he 
watches from the window of his barracks: “Les flors mateixes, l’herba, els 
fruiters, semblen queixar-se de la tristesa que els embolcalla. … Una 
comunitat de sentiments s’ha establert entre [Emili] i les plantes, ja que 
també ell protesta contra la tristesa de la diada” (102–03) (The flowers 
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themselves, the grass, the fruit trees, seem to lament the sadness that 
surrounds them. A community of feeling has been established between the 
plants and Emili, since he too is protesting against the sadness of the day).  
The natural world stands witness to Emili’s suffering and participates in his 
mournful vigil. Emili’s distress is compounded by the memory of a different 
landscape, that of Barcelona “sota el cel refulgent i uns sentiments en 
efervescència” (103) (under a dazzling sky with feelings of ebullience). In 
Emili’s memory of his wedding day, the brilliance of the sky resonates with 
his elation, and the contrast with his current misery pains him. Watching the 
dark sky from a window, Emili is assailed by memories of polychromatic 
landscapes from his past, which surge into his consciousness: “El cap li 
barrina terres enllà, passats molts sembrats, moltes prades, molts rius i 
moltes serres. L’ofega la grisor buida i dissolvent d’aquest present, i més 
avui que l’exciten els records d’uns colors al·lucinants” (103–04) (His head 
carries him away to faraway lands, through an array of pastures, meadows, 
rivers, and mountains. He is drowning in the gray and evanescent emptiness 
of the present, and even more so today that he is animated by memories of 
marvelous colors). Amat-Piniella associates his protagonist’s melancholy 
with the color gray, using synesthesia to relate Emili’s visual impressions of 
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the surrounding winter landscape with the character’s psychological state. 
By contrast, happier times are connected with vibrant colors and an untamed 
wilderness of fields, rivers, and mountains, which contrasts with the 
regimented flowerbeds and lawns that are enclosed by the concentration 
camp barracks. The fertile landscapes of Emili’s past bring into sharp relief 
the sterility of his present existence. Amat-Piniella evokes a desert landscape 
to capture Emili’s desolation, which is metaphorized as “aquesta secada en 
la meva ànima” (105) (this drought in my soul).  
 Levi also renders emotional states in descriptions of the natural 
world. The prisoners’ fear of an impending selection, in which the more 
emaciated among them will be singled out for extermination, is associated 
with the arrival of winter: “In quel modo con cui si vede finire una speranza, 
cosí stamattina è stato inverno” (111) (In the same way as one sees hope 
evaporate, winter came this morning). Levi’s use of the pathetic fallacy, as 
the prisoners’ foreboding is reflected in the ominous approach of winter, is 
apt given that the weather was truly a matter of life or death in the camps. 
Winter was synonymous with death in the outdoor labor battalions, so the 
prisoners’ apprehensions about the imminent selection, in which they will 
have to feign optimum health in order to have any chance of being spared, 
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are doubly justified. The prisoners’ gradual loss of hope as the days draw in 
is described in terms that echo the seasonal transformation of the natural 
world: 
Ognuno sentiva, giorno per giorno, le forze fuggire, la volontà di 
vivere sciogliersi, la mente ottenebrarsi; e la Normandia e la Russia 
erano cosí lontane, e l’inverno cosí vicino; cosí concrete la fame e la 
desolazione, e cosí irreale tutto il resto, che non pareva possibile che 
veramente esistesse un mondo e un tempo, se non il nostro mondo di 
fango, e il nostro tempo sterile e stagnante a cui eravamo oramai 
incapaci di immaginare una fine. (104–05) 
 
(Day by day we all felt our strength fade, our will to live melt away, 
our mind grow dark. Normandy and Russia were so far away, and 
winter so near. Hunger and desolation were now concrete facts, and 
everything else was so unreal that it did not seem possible that there 
was a world and time other than our world of mud and our sterile and 
stagnant time, whose end we were now incapable of imagining.)  
News of Allied victories fails to overcome their gloom. Their remaining 
strength diminishes like the fugitive hours of daylight and their thoughts 
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darken; their will to live is consumed in the cold. Desolate, sterile, and 
stagnant, their existence resembles their harsh surroundings. 
The spiritual suffering in Semprún’s depiction of Buchenwald 
becomes palpable, as in Amat-Piniella’s K.L. Reich, in visions glimpsed of 
the outside world. Thus Emili has a favored spot from which he can gaze at 
the countryside beyond the walls of the camp, yet the vibrant green hues 
remind him not of regeneration and renewal but of his own impotence (68). 
In Le grand voyage too, the surrounding landscape taunts the protagonist 
and reinforces his condition as prisoner. His gaze on a nearby village that 
lies just beyond the camp enclosure is imbued with a sense of poignancy that 
stems from its unattainable quality: 
On voyait la plaine de Thuringe, riche et grasse. ... C’était le 
printemps, c’était dimanche, les gens se promenaient. Il y avait des 
gosses, parfois. Ils couraient en avant, ils criaient. Il y avaient des 
femmes, aussi, qui s’arrêtaient sur le bord de la route pour cueillir les 
fleurs du printemps. (28) 
 
(You could see the Thuringian plain, rich and fat. It was spring, it 
was Sunday, people were out walking. There were kids sometimes. 
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They ran ahead shouting. There were women too, who stopped at the 
side of the road to pick the spring flowers.)  
The vision of the landscape is the reverse image of the protagonist’s 
melancholy existence in the camp. At first glance, riche and grasse seem a 
strange choice of adjectives to describe a landscape, but these qualities 
connote the sustenance that is absent from the prisoners’ diet and from the 
thin and watery soup on which they subsist. The village therefore constitutes 
an idealized projection of the happiness and bounty lacking within the camp. 
Other landscapes in Le grand voyage exemplify a comparable 
function. In the midst of his deportation, the protagonist catches snapshots of 
a sedate and homely existence beyond the pandemonium that reigns within 
the cattle car: “Mon train à moi siffle dans la vallée de la Moselle et je vois 
défiler lentement le paysage de l’hiver. Le soir tombe. Il y a des promeneurs 
sur la route, en bordure de la voie. Ils vont vers ce petit village couronné de 
fumées calmes” (25) (My train whistles in the Moselle valley and I see the 
winter landscape slowly file past. Night is falling. There are people walking 
on the road alongside the track. They are heading toward this small village 
crowned by calm plumes of smoke). The calm he perceives outside is the 
very sensation for which the protagonist yearns amid the turbulence in 
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which he is enveloped. The contrast between the interior and the exterior 
torments Semprún’s protagonist (26). Later he begins to hallucinate, as his 
restricted movement induces a suffocating sensation of stasis, and his 
craving for freedom generates the illusion that the surrounding landscape has 
become animated with the capacity for independent locomotion that he 
lacks. It is, then, the night that appears to move and the surrounding 
landscape that rushes forward, enveloping the deportees within its unfurled 
contours (81).  
As a symbol of immemorial calm, the landscape bodies forth the 
composure and peace that Semprún’s protagonist desires.41 At times, the 
contrast serves merely to heighten the protagonist’s anguished sense of 
imprisonment. But there are other occasions in which the protagonist derives 
encouragement from the landscape and counterpoises his troubled spirit 
against the solace he perceives in the outside world. His ambivalence about 
the landscape, which is charged with both positive and negative emotion, is 
palpable when the Moselle valley, viewed from inside the cattle car, 
monopolizes the protagonist’s attention. The first time the valley appears 
there is the same sense of communion with nature found in K.L. Reich as a 
dejected Emili perceives his sorrow reflected back at him in the rainfall 
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outside. Semprún writes, “Ma vie n’est plus que ce battement de paupières 
qui me dévoile la vallée de la Moselle. Ma vie a fui de moi, elle plane sur 
cette vallée d’hiver, elle est cette vallée douce et tiède dans le froid de 
l’hiver” (15) (My life is nothing more than this blinking that lays bare the 
valley of the Moselle. My life has broken away from me, it hovers over this 
winter valley; it is this sweet and warm valley in the cold of winter). The 
protagonist transmigrates from a corporeal form into an ethereal mountain 
spirit via his gaze that enables an escape from his incarceration. But the use 
of oxymoron in the juxtaposition of “douce” and “tiède” with “le froid de 
l’hiver” suggests the instability of this spiritual union. The valley seems to 
offer consolation but it does so at the price of self-annihilation: “La Moselle 
me rentre par les yeux, inonde mon regard, gorge d’eaux lentes mon âme 
pareille à une éponge. Je ne suis rien d’autre que cette Moselle qui envahit 
mon être par les yeux. Il ne faut pas me laisser distraire de cette joie 
sauvage” (15–16) (The Moselle rushes in through my eyes, flooding my 
gaze and filling my sponge-like soul with its slow waters. I am nothing other 
than this Moselle that invades my being through my eyes. I cannot allow 
myself to be distracted from this wild joy). The verbs inonder, gorger, and 
envahir transmit a sense of violence that undercuts the soothing properties of 
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the landscape. The protagonist’s gaze is conditioned by an overriding sense 
of anguish, so that even consolatory symbols are contaminated by his 
suffering. Thus the coming of dawn, a traditional symbol of hope, is 
corrupted by the deportees’ despair. While the new day seems to mark 
progress toward their destination, it carries the promise of a return to 
darkness: “L’aube se déploie d’elle-même ... vers son anéantissement 
rutilant” (117) (Dawn advances on its own, toward its shimmering 
annihilation). The melancholy of the deportees’ nightly ritual of suffering 
shapes the protagonist’s perception of the cycle of day and night. The night 
is conceptualized as inherently lugubrious, a harbinger of the fate that awaits 
the deportees at the end of their journey. 
In Le grand voyage representations of the landscape are marked by 
the protagonist’s emotions and particularly by the anguish of incarceration. 
On occasion, these landscapes are a channel for the expression of desires and 
reflect back at the protagonist the ideals missing from his own barren 
existence. The idealized qualities of the exterior world are the reverse image 
of the narrator’s suffering. When pain reaches its apogee in Le grand 
voyage, Semprún shifts our attention to the landscape as a cathartic escape. 
When suffering becomes inexpressible, the landscape substitutes it as an 
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alternative reality, a place where pain is sublimated in the ethereal. In these 
instances the landscape functions as a metaphor for the absence of pain, the 
world beyond the protagonist’s current torment, and as an embodiment of 
the positive emotions deriving from the protagonist’s spiritual escape from 
confinement. The Moselle valley is an emotional buttress and is 
anthropomorphized as a travelling companion (81). But elsewhere the 
natural world fails to ameliorate the protagonist’s foreboding and sense of 
turmoil. 
*** 
The commonalities in the representation of suffering in Levi’s Se questo è 
un uomo, Semprún’s Le grand voyage, and Amat-Piniella’s K.L. Reich are 
not indicative of any direct influence, although the possibility that Semprún 
and Amat-Piniella were influenced by the earlier work of Levi certainly 
cannot be ruled out.42 The range of zoomorphic and anthropomorphic tropes 
and the variety of ends to which they are employed suggest that the authors 
arrived at these devices independently. The coincidence of animal imagery 
in the three works can be explained by the dehumanizing nature of the 
concentrationary experience. Animal metaphors are a compelling device for 
describing pain inflicted on the body: the sensory experience of pain brings 
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about a heightened consciousness of the body, and the realization of physical 
frailty purges delusions of immortality and forces sufferers to reckon with 
their ineluctable condition as terrestrial creatures. Similarly, a gaze directed 
toward the natural world is an effective medium for the expression of 
psychological suffering. Emotional concord with nature constitutes a vehicle 
for the spirit to rebel against the constraints of the physical world. The 
pathetic fallacy is, moreover, a coherent rhetorical device for depictions of 
an experience that was affected in such great measure by the weather. Wet 
and cold signified death, whereas the summer brought temporary respite 
from the more pressing hardship in the outdoor labor battalions. 
The distinction between the physiological and psychological facets 
of suffering, which is enunciated at the level of the divergent figurative 
lexicon used to capture the nature of the experience in each case, reveals a 
dualist understanding of pain in these three texts. Physical pain is strongly 
linked with animal imagery, whereas mental pain tends to be associated with 
natural imagery. While such a distinction goes against the grain of current 
scientific thinking on pain, which rejects dualist models, dualism has been 
common in religious and philosophical treatment of pain.43 Drawing on 
these traditions, the three texts reveal the ways suffering was conceptualized 
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in the Nazi camps and suggest the commonalities in how the experience was 
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